Inflation

Post n°275
Published on 06/23/2022

By Paul Bouche, Julien Demuynck, Erwan Gautier, Frédérique Savignac

For the first time, the Banque de France is publishing the results of a survey on business leaders’ inflation expectations, collected since the end of 2021. One-year inflation expectations have increased since the beginning of the year and their median stands at 5% in the second quarter of 2022. Longer-term expectations (3-5 years) are also rising, but more slowly, with a median of 3%. This survey was conducted prior to the ECB's monetary policy normalisation announced on 9 June, which is expected to contribute to the gradual "re-anchoring" of inflation expectations.

Chart 1: Changes in inflation expectations since end-2021 in France   (median in %)
Chart 1: Changes in inflation expectations since end-2021 in France (median in %) Note: median weighted by the number of employees in the company and the value added in the company's sector, 1% of the highest responses are not taken into account in the calculations. Source: IE-Banque de France survey.
Post n°268
Published on 05/11/2022

By Sebastian Stumpner

This blog post examines to what extent the recent surge in international transport costs has fuelled US import price inflation. While we find a moderate effect at the aggregate level, there are significant differences across products that are largely driven by the degree of containerisation.

Chart 1: The share of transport costs has increased only for containerised goods
Chart 1: The share of transport costs has increased only for containerised goods Source: Author’s calculations based on data from TradeDataMonitor.
Post n°261
Published on 03/15/2022

A central bank’s inflation objective can be formulated using a point target, a target range or a combination of the two. In this blog, we show the disadvantages of a target range for anchoring inflation expectations and for macroeconomic stabilisation. The analysis thereby underpins the ECB’s adoption of a clear and symmetric 2% inflation point target.

Chart 1: Inflation objectives, Q2 2020
Chart 1: Inflation objectives, Q2 2020 Source: Central bank websites, authors’ illustration.
Post n°233
Published on 10/14/2021

By Erwan Gautier, Magali Marx and Paul Vertier

A 1% increase in the price of imported refined diesel ultimately translates into a 0.75% increase in the pre-tax price and a 0.3% increase in the pump price of diesel including taxes in France. The adjustment does not occur immediately but is rapid: after one week, the increase in the pre-tax price is 0.45%, i.e. more than 50% of the final pass-through. Prices respond in the same way to an upward or downward shock.

Chart 1: Response of diesel prices to a 1% shock in the commodity cost
Chart 1: Response of diesel prices to a 1% shock in the commodity cost Sources: Ministry for the Ecological and Solidarity Transition, Reuters. Authors' calculations.
Post n°232
Published on 10/13/2021

By Yannick Kalantzis and Youssef Ulgazi

The recent rise in French inflation is temporary in nature but could last for a few more quarters. It is linked to a normalisation of prices after the lows seen in 2020, and to the increase in industrial goods and energy prices. After reaching a peak on the back of these temporary effects, inflation should come back to below the 2% mark over the course of 2022.

Chart 1: Banque de France projection for French inflation (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, %)
Chart 1: Banque de France projection for French inflation (Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, %) Source: INSEE data up to the second quarter of 2021 and for the data point in the third quarter of 2021. Shaded area shows Banque de France projections. For the third quarter, only the inflation figure for July was available at the time of the projections
Post n°52
Published on 03/09/2018

By Eric Monnet and Angel Gomez

The difference in core inflation between the United States and the euro area is mainly due to housing rents. Since last year’s blogpost on the issue, this feature has become even more blatant: core inflation excluding housing rents is currently lower in the United States than in the euro area, whereas US core inflation is still much higher.

Chart 1: Core inflation vs. core inflation excluding housing rents (quarterly data). Sources: CPI (BLS) for the United States and HICP (Eurostat) for the euro area
Post n°50
Published on 02/28/2018

By Yannick Kalantzis and Jean-François Ouvrard

A EUR 10 rise in the price of oil results in a 0.4% increase in consumer prices in France and the euro area. A significant part of this rise can be attributed to the non-energy components of the consumer price index. This indirect effect amounts to 0.1 percentage point in the euro area and 0.15 percentage point in France.

Actual inflation and inflation simulated with a constant oil price in the euro area (% change, yoy) Source: Eurostat, authors' calculations. Note: at each date, the oil price is assumed to be constant over the two previous years.
Post n°49
Published on 02/22/2018

Since 2008, growth in nominal industry-level wage floors in France has slowed progressively. In a near-zero inflation environment, wage floors have risen by less than 1% per year since 2014. Increases in negotiated wages are largely determined by past inflation and by changes in the national minimum wage (NMW). As a result, the upturn in inflation observed in 2017 could lead to slightly stronger growth in nominal negotiated wages in 2018.

Post n°40
Published on 11/29/2017

By Louis de Charsonville, Violaine Faubert and Antoine Sigwalt

Since the start of 2016, French core inflation has been far below the euro area average. This gap can be attributed to the differences in economic fundamentals, such as the slower improvement in the labour market in France compared with that of the euro area as a whole, and, more recently, temporary shocks, such as the decline in the communications prices.

Post n°35
Published on 10/31/2017

By Gilbert Cette, Laure Frey and Gilles Moec[1]

The Fed attributes the current disconnect between a tight labour market and low inflation to transitory factors, while also acknowledging an unusual level of uncertainty. It is not the first time such disconnect appears. In the late 1990s already such configuration had triggered a debate on a structural downward shift in inflation. It later transpired that this assessment was based on erroneous data.

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